HIV prevalence in Southern Africa is the highest in the world and the impacts of HIV/AIDS in the region are devastating at all levels of society, including the wider economy. Government response to date has lagged behind the pace of the epidemic, but intervention programs are now beginning to focus on a broad range of interventions to combat its further spread and to mitigate its impacts.
The analysis identifies potential target groups for a vaccine, and estimates how many individuals would be in need of vaccination. It develops a method for estimating how many cases of HIV infection are likely to be avoided for each vaccinated individual. The cases avoided are of two kinds: primary?the individual case that might have occurred in people who are vaccinated , and secondary-the number of people that the vaccinated individual would otherwise have caused to become infected. Both of these depend on assumptions about the efficacy and duration of protection of the vaccine and the extent and nature of sexual risk behavior in the population groups. The analysis distinguishes between the HIV cases averted per vaccination, and the cases averted per 100 recruits into a vaccination program.
The cases averted per 100 recruits is used to develop a priority ranking of the identified population groups for vaccination. The paper discusses the issue of ease of access to those groups, and how the differential costs would affect the vaccination strategy. The essential conclusion is that an expensive vaccine should be administered to commercial sex workers first, while an inexpensive vaccine would be better administered first to general population groups, in particular schoolchildren.
The paper concludes with a discussion of current levels of public and private expenditure on HIV prevention and treatment, and the implications for an assessment of the willingness to pay for an eventual HIV vaccine. 
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Introduction
Although the HIV virus appeared later in Southern Africa than elsewhere on the continent, Southern Africa now has the highest rates of HIV prevalence in the world. Approximately one adult in five is HIV positive (see Figure 1-1) , and Southern African countries face the prospect of the reversal of hard won progress in development, resulting in deepening human poverty and social dislocation. Valuable human resources are being lost, affecting all sectors, public as well as private. HIV/AIDS will hamper governments' ability to manage their economies and to deliver social services. 
Approach of the Paper
The principal goal of this paper is to provide a framework for comparing different AIDS vaccination strategies to guide the process of targeting, should that become necessary. The paper begins with a brief review of the health and developmental impacts of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa, and the current responses in the seven countries considered with regard to prevention, treatment and vaccine development.
In section 2, the paper presents an analysis based on calculating the total number of cases averted per 100 entrants into a vaccination program, under the assumption that prior screening for existing HIV infection is impractical and is not carried out. This indicator is then calculated for each of 12 identified risk groups and used to rank them in order of effectiveness. This leads to a discussion of access and targeting issues.
In section 3, the paper presents evidence of existing ability and willingness to pay for an HIV vaccine, based upon expenditure on other health items or vaccines, and a brief analysis of economic motivation. The paper concludes with recommendations for vaccination strategies under differing assumptions about the cost, efficacy and duration of protection offered by any potential vaccine.
The Health and Development Impacts of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa
HIV prevalence
The estimated adult prevalence of HIV in selected countries of Southern Africa is shown in Figure 1 -1. South Africa is by far the largest of the countries listed, with about 61 percent of the adult population of the region, and therefore dominates the overall average rate of 21.4 percent. There are, however, considerable regional variations within South Africa, with rates above 30 percent in KwaZulu Natal, and below 10 percent in the Western Cape. The highest regional rate of 35.8 percent is found in Botswana.
The figure also shows the populations (both total and adult -i.e., aged 15-49), the per-capita GDP and the net secondary school enrollment ratios. All of the totals shown in the table are weighted by population from the countries where data were available.
Demographic impact
The demographic impacts of HIV/AIDS arise through its impact on mortality and fertility. Deaths due to AIDS can be expected to cause a dramatic increase in the mortality rates in the 15-49 age group, where they would otherwise be expected to be very low. In the case of infant mortality, there is clear evidence from Botswana and other African countries that HIV/AIDS has caused a stagnation or even a rise in infant and child mortality rates (Timaeus 1998 ).
The demographic impact of HIV/AIDS is often measured in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy is, however, an unsatisfactory indicator, since it depends upon assumptions about age and sex specific mortality rates. Accurate measures of age specific mortality are difficult to obtain, and most published estimates of life expectancy make use of mortality rate projections. These projections have not yet been validated against national population census data since such data are usually only collected every 10 years. Both South Africa and Botswana have recently conducted population censuses, and results from these will in due course yield estimates of mortality. Early estimates from the Botswana census (no official publication is yet available) indicate that the projections used to date in life expectancy calculations are not valid.
The evidence from survey data gives some indication of impact. Figure 1 -2 below shows measures of adult mortality by age and sex from Botswana (1997 demographic survey) as compared with mortality (in dotted lines) as measured in the 1991 population census. There is clear evidence of substantially raised mortality in the 25 to 40 age groups. As indicated above, however, these raised mortality rates are substantially below the rates that had been projected for the year 1997/98 -for example, see Botswana MFDP (2000a) . In addition, early estimates for the total head count from the Botswana population census in 2001 indicate a total of almost 1.7 million. This is close to projections obtained before HIV/AIDS was accounted for, and is at the very high end of AIDS scenario projections produced prior to the census (most of these were in the range 1.4-1.6 million). In the case of Botswana, it may be that the period from infection to death is higher than was previously expected, but this may not apply across all of the Southern African countries.
A recent study by the Medical Research Council (MRC) in South Africa (MRC 2000) documented the steady rise in adult mortality during the 1990's, with female mortality in the 25-29 age group increasing by a factor of 3.5 between 1985 and 2001. AIDS deaths were broadly compatible with a number of different projection models, in particular the ASSA600 model produced by the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA). The report concluded:
While there is inevitably some degree of uncertainty because of the assumptions underlying both the model and the interpretation of the empirical data, we estimate that about 40 percent of the adult deaths aged 15-49 that occurred in the year 2000 were due to HIV/AIDS and that about 20 percent of all adult deaths in that year were due to AIDS. When this is combined with the excess deaths in childhood, it is estimated that AIDS accounted for about 25 percent of all deaths in the year 2000 and has become the single biggest cause of death. The projections show that, without treatment to prevent AIDS, the number of AIDS deaths can be expected to grow, within the next 10 years, to more than double the number of deaths due to all other causes, resulting in 5 to 7 million cumulative AIDS deaths in South Africa by 2010. 
Economic impact
The expected economic impacts of HIV/AIDS arise through several identified mechanisms. First, the increased mortality among young adults depletes the most economically productive part of the population, reducing the supply of labour across all skill categories. In addition, raised mortality among older, more experienced workers will tend to reduce the average level of work experience among the workforce. The resulting loss of skills will cause a reduction in productivity.
Second, there is an increase in morbidity among workers who are beginning to suffer the symptoms of AIDS. This will have the effect of reducing the average level of productivity, and hence the aggregate level of output.
Third, households will face reduced incomes because of the loss of income earners, at the same time facing higher expenditures because of additional demands for health care. This will have the effect of increasing the levels of poverty and reducing the levels of savings in the economy. The capital available for investment will therefore be reduced, with a negative impact on aggregate economic growth. For example, Greener, Jefferis, and Siphambe (2000a) found that income poverty over a 10-year period might be expected to increase by at least 5 percentage points over what it otherwise might have been.
At a government level, there will tend to be a reduction in revenue from taxation and other sources as a result of reduced economic growth. At the same time, there will be pressure to increase expenditures on health care and welfare to mitigate the impacts of HIV/AIDS. This will have the effect of pushing governments towards the need for deficit spending or reducing expenditure on other development areas. In particular, the costs of AIDS treatment will, in the first instance, be borne by governments. For example, Greener, Jefferis, and Siphambe (2000a) found that the net impact on the government budget over a 10-year period in Botswana would be equivalent to a 20percent reduction in revenue. Pressure on health budgets may also cause a "crowding out" effect, where expenditure on other health priorities may decrease. This effect may cause further economic impacts not directly related to HIV/AIDS. AIDS will also cause human resource problems for firms and organisations, which may lose employees in vital skill areas and face difficulty in recruitment and training.
Numerous studies over the last 10 years have found estimates of the probable size of aggregate macroeconomic impact, mainly in African countries where the epidemic is the most serious. Results have indicated that HIV/AIDS will probably reduce the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by between 0.5 percent and 2.6 percent. For example, see Over (1992) , Kambou, Devarajan, and Over (1992) , Cuddington (1993a, b) , Bloom and Mahal (1995) , Arndt and Lewis (2000) , Greener, Jefferis and Siphambe (2000a,b) and Bureau for Economic Research (2001) . The overall conclusion of these studies is that the aggregate impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP growth is quite small and well within the range of variation that would be caused through the normal instruments of economic management.
Development impacts
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is placing a severe burden on all levels of the health care system throughout the region. Hospital admissions are increasing rapidly and more than half of the available hospital beds are occupied by AIDS related cases, including tuberculosis. For example see Botswana MFDP (2000b) . The epidemic is threatening to overwhelm the health services, and the expansion of home based care facilities for AIDS patients is inevitable.
The HIV epidemic has fueled a parallel epidemic of tuberculosis (TB), exacerbating the problems of the relatively low coverage of effective TB immunisation in much of the region. For example, see Botswana MFDP (2000a) , and the data presented in Figure 3 -1.
The education sector has been severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The death rates among teachers and lecturers have been increasing sharply in recent years, for example see Botswana MOE and DFID (2000) . Although death rates are low among school students, HIV/AIDS has disrupted their home environments as adults fall ill and need to be cared for. There is speculation about how this situation is affecting the quality of teaching and the quality of school work. It is clear that the demographic impacts of HIV/AIDS will create significant planning problems for education in the future.
The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS is exacerbated by a cultural environment in which issues of sexuality and sexually transmitted disease are not openly discussed. There are a number of pervasive culturally based myths about HIV/AIDS which reduce the impact of some of the prevention campaigns and encourage a fatalistic attitude. The issues raised by the epidemic impinge upon long standing taboos and result in a high level of stigma being associated with HIV/AIDS, for example see UNDP (2000).
Despite an apparently high level of knowledge about the nature of HIV/AIDS and how it can be prevented, the steadily rising HIV prevalence (as measured in ante-natal clinics) indicates little evidence of a widespread change in sexual behavior in the region. There is clearly a need to understand the reasons for this and to understand the possible effects that the introduction of an HIV vaccine might have.
Current responses
The early response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa, as elsewhere, was essentially biomedical in nature, focusing on increasing national public awareness of HIV, training health workers in AIDS clinical management, and on establishing monitoring systems in ante-natal clinics. This broadened into efforts to prevent the spread of HIV through media campaigns promoting the use of condoms or abstaining from sexual activity. The epidemic progressed unabated however.
Prevention campaigns in most countries have emphasized the message of ABC (Abstain, Be faithful, Condomize). Some assessments (for example UNDP Botswana, 2000) have concluded that the prevention campaigns have not, to date, been able to address the true underlying factors that fuel the campaign. These include intergenerational sex, poverty and the low status of women.
In recent years, most of the countries considered here have adopted a much more wide ranging multi-sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS which seeks to involve both government and civil society on a broad front. This includes an expansion of community home based care, and an expansion of life skills training, and a phased introduction of a range of treatment options. The number of Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) Centers is increasing rapidly. Botswana has begun to implement a program which ultimately seeks to make AIDS treatment available to a broad sector of the population. This program is at an early stage and is not yet administering ARV treatment to very many people, but it is clear that the logistics associated with widespread ARV treatment will be formidable. The recent policy shift in South Africa is likely to lead to a rapid expansion of ARV and other forms of treatment, particularly for vulnerable groups such as pregnant or breastfeeding women.
HIV vaccine development
A number of candidate vaccines are currently in or about to begin trials . This is a result of advances in animal models and clinical research (Johnston and Flores 2001) . A number of vaccine candidates are ready for, or already undergoing, phase one trials in Europe, the United States and Africa. Not all HIV types are the same, and a number of different subtypes exist. These different subtypes of HIV are prevalent in different parts of the world, but candidate vaccines are often targeted at one subtype. Therefore, a vaccine may become available for some subtypes before others and thus may be used far earlier in some parts of the world. Subtype A is most prevalent in South Africa.
The current candidates are primarily aimed at subtype B, although at least one subtype A candidate has begun trials. The most advanced trials are for the phase three VaxGen candidate aimed at subtypes B and E. These are currently underway in the United States and Thailand, and interim results are expected by the end of this year (Johnston and Flores 2001) . The company responsible is already planning for large scale commercial production. This, however, offers little hope to those fighting the epidemic in Africa, since the B and E subtypes are not prevalent in the African epidemic.
In South Africa, where subtype A is dominant, phase one trials are set to begin only this year. Researchers in South Africa believe that a commercially available vaccine for use in the region is 15 to 20 years away, although there appears to be consensus that a viable vaccine can be developed (Morris, Williamson, and Vardas 2001) . The South African government strongly supports the vaccine initiative and provides funds from the national budget towards its development and testing, run primarily by the South African Medical Research Council. The development of an acceptable vaccine for use within in South Africa, and indeed within the continent, is far less advanced than elsewhere in the world.
Vaccination strategies
Introduction
An ideal HIV vaccine would be cheap, freely available, a single dose, simple to administer, one hundred percent effective, and last a lifetime with no side effects. Although one day such a vaccine may become available, the first available vaccines are unlikely to be as ideal. They are more likely to be expensive, multi-dose, less than 100 percent effective and last only a few years. The prohibitively high cost may make the widespread provision of early vaccines unaffordable in many low and middle-income countries, including those in Southern Africa.
In such a situation, interventions will have to make best use of the available finances and apply the most cost effective and politically acceptable strategy. This would involve, amongst other things, the estimation of the effectiveness of targeting different groups within the population and the cost of targeting. The vaccination of members of high-risk groups would likely provide the most effective outcome per vaccine given, but the cost of accessing such groups as opposed to lower risk groups may be sufficient to make easily accessed, but low risk, groups a more cost effective target. The political consequences of targeting high risk groups may also be a major factor influencing target choice.
This section aims to evaluate the conflict between cost and effectiveness and identify the most cost-effective options for a vaccination strategy, with the primary focus on where to begin. While it is not possible to make definitive conclusions while the characteristics and cost of the possible vaccines are unknown, it is possible to raise and discuss a number of issues which will expedite the development of a strategy once the required information has become available.
The section begins with an outline of the method used in the analysis, which is followed by the results and a discussion of their implications. As stated previously, the analysis and discussion concentrates on a vaccine designed to prevent HIV infection rather than one designed to prevent the progression from HIV to AIDS.
Analysis
The analysis required the estimation of the number of infections averted when vaccinating people with different characteristics, and the relative difficulty of access to the different groups. This section outlines, in brief, the methods used in estimating these parameters, while a more detailed explanation is provided in the appendix.
First, the paper outlines the manner in which the number of infections averted was calculated, broken into two categories:
• The calculation of primary infections averted -i.e., the number of vaccinated individuals who would otherwise have become infected with HIV
• The calculation of secondary infections averted -i.e., the number of people who would have become infected by those vaccinated individuals who became HIV positive
These calculations together yield an estimate of the total number of infections averted for vaccinations of HIV negative individuals for the different groups (i.e., primary plus secondary).
It was felt, however, that ending the analysis at this point could be misleading. Estimating the total number of infections averted masks the problem (and associated cost) of screening for existing HIV infection, particularly among high-risk candidates. For this reason, the number of infections averted per one hundred entrants from a target group was estimated. The method used for this calculation is outlined below.
This section outlines the approach taken to deal with the question of differential access and associated cost. The paper also discusses the method applied in the selection of possible target groups.
The analysis presented in this paper is a simple and easily understandable approach, which is aimed at raising important considerations, rather than at providing accurate numbers. While it is possible to refine the method to improve the estimations, this would dramatically increase the computational complexity, adding little to the discussions outlined.1 Due to its simplicity, the approach does suffer a number of limitations which are outlined in the appendix. Where they relate to the discussions, they are mentioned in the text.
Method to compare strategies
Primary infections averted . The probability of a "primary" infection refers to whether or not an individual would have been infected with HIV if they had not been vaccinated. It does not include the probability that the individual would have gone on to infect other people. This is referred to as "secondary" infection, and is described in the next section.
The number of primary infections averted for a group of HIV negative vaccinated individuals will depend on four factors:
• The efficacy of the vaccine -i.e., the probability that a vaccinated person is protected from infection
• The number of people in the group being vaccinated
• The duration of the period of immunity offered by the vaccine 1 For a detailed modeling exercise see Stover and others (2002) .
• The average probability that a typical group member would otherwise have become infected during the period of protection of the vaccine, called the "period infection probability."
The meaning of the "period infection probability" depends on the length of the period. If the period under consideration is one year, then the period probability is equal to the probability that an individual will be infected during that year. This is also the definition of the incidence of HIV infection for the group. For periods of longer than one year, the period probability will depend on the way in which HIV incidence evolves for the cohort over the period. The evolution of HIV incidence is in turn dependent upon the expected risk behavior within the cohort and will vary considerably among different risk groups.
There is, however, a relationship between the period probability and the HIV prevalence in a cohort. In general, a cohort is likely to experience a high period probability at the early stages of the onset of risk behavior when prevalence is low. As the cohort evolves, the period probability will fall as the prevalence rises, since there are fewer individuals in the cohort left to infect.
The analysis estimated the primary cases averted by simulating the evolution of prevalence and infection probability for different risk groups. This made use of the illustrative risk groups as represented in the simulation model developed by the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA). 2 Although it is no substitute for the use of real data (which are lacking), the benefit of this method is that it gives a realistic estimate of the period probability in a Southern African setting, while arriving at a "best guess" at the differences in likely risk behavior among the different risk groups.
Secondary infections averted.
Vaccinating an individual will not only prevent the infection of that individual, but also the secondary infections that would have resulted from that individual infecting others. The number of secondary infections averted will depend upon a variety of factors and will differ substantially for different individuals. For example, preventing the infection of a commercial sex worker will avoid substantially more secondary infections than preventing the primary infection of an older woman in a monogamous relationship. Although there are a host of other factors which must be considered in designing a vaccination program, the number of secondary infections averted is clearly an important component.
A variety of variables is instrumental in determining the number of secondary infections averted. These include:
• the number of sexual partners the individual will have over the period for which the vaccine offers protection
• the number of sexual contacts they have with these partners
• their probability of being infected, per sexual contact
• whether they, or their partners, have a sexually transmitted infection (STI)
• whether their partners are already infected with HIV
• the frequency of condom use.
It is necessary to calculate the probable number of people the individual would have infected if he or she had not been successfully vaccinated. The more sexual partners and more sexual contacts they have, the higher the number of people they would infect. Similarly, the greater the individual's probability of having an STI and the higher the STI prevalence of their partners, the higher the probability -per sexual contact -that they would transmit HIV. On the other hand, the higher their condom use, the lower the probability of transmission per contact. Finally, the higher the existing level of HIV among their partners, the lower the chance that their future partners are HIV negative to begin with. Preventing a repeat infection of an already infected individual is not an infection averted. When estimating these variables, it is necessary to consider how behaviors may differ between casual sexual contacts and long-term partners.
These variables, as well as those relating to the duration and effectiveness of vaccines, interact with one another to determine the number of secondary infections averted. The implications of these interactions were estimated with a set of equations, which are outlined in the appendix.
It is also possible that a vaccine may lead to changes in sexual behavior resulting from changed perceptions of risk. In the calculations presented in this paper, no attempt has been made to introduce behavior change. The behavior variables used in the calculations are based on the data that are available, which are weak and incomplete. There is, therefore, no quantitative basis for estimating the impact of a vaccine on behavior change in the different risk groups, so it was not included in the calculations. However, possible behavior changes will be very important in vaccination program design, and the implications of changes in behavior prompted by the introduction of a vaccine are discussed below.
Total infections averted. The previous two sections have outlined the basis for the calculation of the number of primary and secondary infections averted. The estimation of the total number of infections averted per vaccinated HIV negative individuals involves the combination of the previous two calculations.
The efficacy of the vaccine will make no difference to the ranking of strategies in terms of their effectiveness, unless vaccination changes risk behavior differently in different target groups. Given the decision to vaccinate, which would in part be motivated by the efficacy, the most effective strategies will be the most effective regardless of the efficacy of the vaccine. A change in the efficacy changes the impact of vaccination of all groups by the same proportion and will not affect their effectiveness in relation to one another. Changes in the duration of protection are, however, more important at this stage.
Changes in the duration change the probability of averting a primary infection. This change will have different implications for the effectiveness of vaccinations in different risk groups. Further the sexual behaviors of different groups will likely vary over time, and a different duration could possibly change the ranking of groups in terms of both effectiveness and cost effectiveness. This issue is discussed in greater detail after the presentation of the results below.
Infections averted per 100 entrants into the program. The method described above estimates the number of infections averted per vaccine administered to an HIV negative individual. The vaccination of an HIV positive individual will result in no infections averted and may well lead to a false sense of security which could increase the risk of others. Considering only the number of infections averted in this way ignores the costs and complications associated with ensuring that only HIV negative individuals receive vaccinations. A more meaningful measure would be the number of infections averted per 100 entrants into a vaccination program. The basis for this calculation is outlined in the appendix.
The vaccination of members of high-risk groups is likely to avert more infections than the vaccination of members of lower risk groups. The impact is, however, likely to be diluted by the need to exclude many vaccination candidates because they are already HIV positive. If the cost of screening is significant, relative to the cost of a vaccine, this may have important implications for policy. Policy decisions may be further complicated by the difficulties associated with locating members of high-risk groups.
Issues of access. The delivery of an HIV vaccine is likely to differ substantially from that associated with currently available vaccines. The majority of currently provided vaccines are administered to young children. The targeting of different population groups will, in some cases, necessitate the active seeking out of participants. The difficulty of access and associated cost are likely to be substantial.
The identified risk groups are classified in terms of their difficulty of access, rated as easy, medium, difficult or very difficult. These classifications are made in terms of once off access and follow up access. The difficulty associated with accessing some groups once off may be very different from the difficulty associated with finding those same people a second or third time for follow up doses. For example, the recruitment of vaccination candidates at a hospital may be very easy for once off doses, but locating those same people for repeat doses would be very difficult.
We do not attempt to quantify the difference in difficulty of access. What is estimated is how large a difference in cost, associated with different levels of difficulty, would change the ranking of different strategies.
If a program aimed at school girls was targeted at fifteen year olds who have very low prevalence, 3 and the vaccination was offered to all entrants, the difference in the costs of access and screening when compared to sex workers would be large. Given the results presented in Figure 2 -1, if the additional costs associated with the targeting of sex workers as opposed to school girls was more than 1.2 times the cost of a vaccinating school girls (including the cost of the dose), then the vaccination of school girls would be more cost effective per 100 entrant. Therefore, particularly if a vaccine requires more than one dose, a vaccination intervention may achieve better results by targeting broader population groups than difficult to access high risk groups. 
Accessonce
Identification of target groups. The above calculations and analysis were performed for twelve different possible target groups. The groups are not mutually exclusive and are not intended as a definitive list, but rather as an array of options to highlight a number of different issues. The groups represent a range across three characteristics: risk behavior, ease of access, and size. Sex workers, high risk transport workers and male STD clinic attendees were selected as the examples of the high risk behavior, while women attending antenatal clinics and high school boys represented low risk behavior. Migrants and sex workers provided examples of difficult to access groups, as opposed to school children whose ease of access depends upon secondary school enrollment (see Figure 1 -1).
Finally, the groups represent a range of possible interventions, from possible subpopulations, such as sex workers, to broader population strategies involving the formally employed or school children. A number of other groups represent the middle ground of the different characteristics: these include the military, prisoners and teachers.
The size and HIV prevalence of each group was based on available data and a number of assumptions. These are presented in the appendix. It was necessary to make assumptions regarding particular sexual behaviors of each group to facilitate the calculation of secondary infections averted. The available data for each country were weighted according to the size of the groups in each country. The number of cases averted shown in the table refer to cases averted by vaccinating the indicated target groups with a vaccine effective for a 5-year period with 100 percent efficacy (i.e., all vaccinations given result in immunity to HIV).
Table of results
The data shown in the table are derived from the country specific data and assumptions presented in Appendix 1 (Figure 1 ), where the populations of the seven countries have been combined and the values of indicators are weighted by population.
The estimates of the size of the groups distinguish between:
• The number required to "catch up." This is the current estimated total size of the group
• The number required for "maintenance." This is the estimated number of new entrants annually into the group.
The table presents the separate calculation of the number of primary cases averted per vaccination and number of secondary cases that would have resulted from each primary case. These are combined into a total number of cases averted per HIV negative person vaccinated.
The cases averted per HIV negative individual would represent the situation if fully effective screening were done before administering vaccine. The cases averted per 100 entrants in the program represent the situation where no screening is carried out.
Discussion of results
Difference between per person and per 100. The above table displays the results of the analysis outlined in the previous section. The 'primary' column presents estimates of the number of primary infections averted for every HIV negative entrant vaccinated. The results suggest that the infection of one commercial sex worker is avoided for every two HIV negative sex workers vaccinated (primary infection rate of 0.51). This can be compared to high school boys, where more than five must be vaccinated to prevent the infection of one of them, as the other four would not have become infected during the duration of protection (primary infection rate of 0.19). At the primary infection stage, the difference in effectiveness of vaccinating different groups is large.
The 'secondary' column displays the estimated number of secondary infections averted for every primary infection averted. That is, assuming the individual vaccinated had become HIV positive how many people would they have gone on to infect? Again, the number is highest for commercial sex workers with an estimate of almost eight secondary infections averted for each averted primary infection. This is far higher than any other group, particularly other female groups such as pregnant women and formal sector female employees, among whom the prevention of a primary infection is likely to result, on average, in the prevention of less than one secondary infection.
Combining the results of the primary and secondary infections averted provides the estimate provided in the table of the number of infections averted per HIV negative individual vaccinated. This figure is lower than the number of secondary infections averted because it takes into account that the vaccinated individual may not have become infected during the time period over which the vaccination works and would therefore not have infected any of their future sexual partners.
In all but the very high risk groups, the result is that the total number of infections averted per HIV negative individual vaccinated is less than one. The vaccination of sex workers appears to be more than six times as effective as the most effective general population alternatives -high school girls and male STD clinic attendees. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the need to first identify HIV negative recipients.
High-risk groups have high levels of HIV infection. Many vaccination candidates would, therefore, have to be excluded. These exclusions reduce the relative effectiveness of vaccinating high-risk groups. The table displays the estimates of the number of infections averted per 100 entrants, from each group, into a vaccination program. For sex workers, 154 infections would be averted for every 100 vaccination candidate sex workers. This result is only just over twice as effective (2.2 times) as vaccinating high school girls, where 70 infections are averted per 100 candidates. Most of the other groups fall into a narrow range, between 44 and 55. The least effective strategy would be to vaccinate in male STD clinics, where only 29 infections would be averted per 100 entrants.
Difficulty of access and associated cost. The smaller the difference in effectiveness between the high risk groups and the general population, the more important the issue of access becomes. If the vaccination of a high risk group was far more effective than a general population group, then vaccination strategies would need to concentrate on locating these groups and providing them with the vaccination. If, however, as is the case here, the difference in effectiveness is less dramatic, the difficulty of access may sway the decision of who to target.
Each group in the table is classified in terms of the difficulty of access. The difficulty of access may differ for once off access as opposed to vaccines which may require repeat doses. For example while once off access to male STD patients is classified as medium difficulty, locating the same men for a repeat dose would be very difficult. The situation would be similar for women attending antenatal clinics.
If a vaccination program is presented with a fixed budget and tasked with preventing as many infections as possible, the decision would have to be based on both the effectiveness of alternative strategies and the cost of access. The above results imply that the vaccination of sex workers prevents the most infections. Access to sex workers is, however, difficult and likely to be costly. Follow up access-locating the same sex workers for repeat doses-would be very difficult and may be impractical to attempt. The vaccination of school girls, however, would be less effective but far easier in terms of access and especially in terms of follow up access. Although secondary school enrollment averages just over 50 percent in the seven countries (see Figure 1 -1), enrollment is increasing throughout the region, and the current rate at the younger end of the age group (12-15 year olds) is likely to be somewhat higher than this.
If a program aimed at school girls was targeted at fifteen year olds who have very low prevalence 4 and the vaccination was offered to all entrants, the difference in the costs of access and screening when compared to sex workers would be large. Given the results presented in Figure 2 -1, if the additional costs associated with the targeting of sex workers as opposed to school girls was more than 1.2 times the cost of vaccinating school girls (including the cost of the dose), then the vaccination of school girls would be more cost effective per 100 entrants. Therefore, particularly if a vaccine requires more than one dose, a vaccination intervention may achieve better results by targeting broader population groups than difficult to access high risk groups.
Importance of timing with high risk groups. The typical pattern of infection in any high-risk group is illustrated in Appendix 2 (Figure 1) , showing the looped path of prevalence and infection probability that a cohort of individuals might follow. The typical pattern is that new entrants into a risk group will exhibit low prevalence in the early stages, with very high period probability of infection. In later stages, they are more likely to exhibit high prevalence, and relatively low period probability of infection.
The formulas used above for primary and secondary cases averted per 100 entrants into a vaccination program indicate that the total cases averted will be proportional to the number of unprotected sexual contacts over the period, and negatively associated with the prevalence of the group (i.e., proportional to one minus the prevalence) and the prevalence of the sexual partners.
This means that the timing of the vaccination is likely to be very important. In general, it will be most effective to vaccinate individuals in a risk group at the point where prevalence is low and period infection probability is high. This is of particular importance in the case of commercial sex workers (CSWs). If we assume that a sex worker is likely to be active for a period of about 5 years 5 (after which the period probability reverts to the population average), then the evolution of the number of cases averted per 100 entrants is illustrated in Figure 2 -2. The figure also shows the evolution of prevalence and five year period probability (on the secondary axis).
As can be seen, the number of cases averted per 100 entrants falls rapidly from almost 300 for a new entrant, to almost zero by the time a CSW has been working for 5 years. This is primarily because of the rapidly rising prevalence -at the end of the 5-year period, almost all entrants to a vaccination program would already be HIV positive.
The rapid change in cases averted as the cohort evolves poses significant problems with respect to access to CSWs, since it is not easy to identify the length of time a CSW has been active prior to recruiting them into a vaccination program. If such targeting were possible, then it would be possible to almost double the effectiveness of vaccination in this group, from the average of 154, to almost 300 cases averted per 100 applicants. 
Percent Probability or Prevalence
Cases per 100 Prevalence Period Probability 5 Five years was the period used in the Thailand study (Tangcharoensathien and others 2001) . A longer period would increase the levels of period probability and cases averted, but would not alter the conclusions -the timing of vaccination would still be of high importance. In the case of teenage girls or boys, the cases averted will depend strongly upon their age at the time of vaccination. Figure 2 -3 shows the evolution of prevalence, five-year period infection probability, and cases averted by age for teenage girls.
The case shown here assumes the onset of sexual activity at age 14-15, with high, HIV incidence and low prevalence at that age. The cases averted rise to a peak of just over 70 per 100 entrants for girls aged between 15 and 16. The rate remains above 60 until age 18, where it decreases rapidly as a result of rising prevalence. The pattern shown here would imply an optimal vaccination age of 14-16 for vaccine that is effective for five years.
The case of teenage boys shows a very similar pattern, but shifted by about three years due to the late r onset of sexual activity. The optimal age using the arguments above would be between 17 and 19 years, and the effectiveness begins to drop sharply by age 21. In practice, however, vaccination would need to take place at an age where secondary school enrollment is highest. This is more likely to be at age 14-15, as for girls.
Implications of duration of effectiveness. The calculation of period infection probability and cases averted presented above has assumed that a possible vaccine will confer immunity to HIV for a period of five years. It is clear that a vaccine with longer duration of effectiveness will in general avert more cases because of the greater duration of immunity. The ranking of risk groups implied by Figure 2 -1 above is not likely to be any different. The absolute differences between groups may change, however. For example, if commercial sex workers are assumed to revert to normal sexual behavior after about five years, then the lifetime difference between CSWs and the general female population would be reduced. However, unless CSWs revert to risk behavior lower than the general female population, it is unlikely that the priority order would be reversed.
The issues of timing discussed above are also similar for vaccines of different duration, with the exception of a vaccine that would confer lifetime immunity. For example, Figure 2 -4 shows how female infection probability (of a non-vaccinated woman) might differ with age for vaccines of various durations. As can be seen, the probability of infection (and hence the cases averted) rises for longer duration. However, the highest infection probability occurs around the ages of 15-17, regardless of the vaccine duration. The optimum targeting age for female adolescents would therefore be the same.
However, in the case of a lifetime effective vaccine, the picture would change. In this case, the infection probability and cases averted would be constant from birth until the onset of risk behavior, when both would begin to fall. The optimum strategy in this case would be to vaccinate children below the age of 15, before the onset of sexual activity. In many cases, the easiest access would be in primary schools, where enrollment is higher than in secondary schools for all of the countries considered here.
Issues relating to behavior change. An issue which has been frequently raised in discussions relating to the introduction of HIV vaccines is the possibility of behavior change. It has been suggested that once individuals have been vaccinated and believe that they are protected, they may increase their risk behavior. If the vaccine they receive is only partially effective, the behavior change may cancel the protective influence or possibly even increase the individuals' risk. This issue needs to be considered in the comparison of possible vaccination strategies. This is an area which urgently requires further research, as presently there is no available empirical evidence of what behavior change may occur and how it might differ between groups. Conceptually, however, it is possible to raise a number of issues. High-risk groups, by definition, have a higher level of high-risk behavior. Furthermore, the marginal cost of such behavior is greater as they are likely to interact with other high-risk groups. Given that they have high-risk behaviors despite having greater costs, the benefit they attach to such high-risk behaviors must be greater than that attached by low risk groups.
If, therefore, a high and a low-risk group are given a vaccine of equal effectiveness, reducing the cost of risky behavior for each group by the same proportion, the high-risk group may increase their risk behavior more than the low risk group. In practical terms, commercial sex workers are likely to increase their risk behavior following vaccination by a larger degree than married women. This raises additional concerns when considering which groups to target and may mean that high-risk groups should not be offered vaccines with low levels of effectiveness.
Furthermore, the ability to interpret the implications of a partially effective vaccine could vary with education. Those with higher levels of education may be better equipped to understand the consequences of behavior change in such a situation. Similarly groups which are easy to access for vaccination are likely also to be easy to access for health education relating to a vaccine, in which case it would be easier to inform them of the necessity to continue, or even improve, existing protective behaviors.
While no research in this regard is available, in theory it seems practical to suggest that low efficacy vaccines would be better targeted at low risk, easy access groups.
Infections averted or delayed?
The method used in this analysis of vaccination options calculates the number of primary and secondary infections averted. This does not, however, address the question of whether these infections are averted or merely delayed. To address this problem adequately would require the use of a simulation model, which is beyond the scope of this paper. If a vaccine with limited duration is administered to an individual whose risk profile is likely to change, as opposed to one whose profile is unlikely to change, the ratio of infections averted to those delayed is likely to be quite different.
The calculation of the quantitative effect of behavioral change is beyond the scope of this paper, since it requires simulation modeling of some kind. The logical next step for the analysis presented here would be to develop a well-founded simulation model incorporating behavioral change and other aspects not considered here, such as the epidemiological effects that would become important if a significant proportion of the sexually active population were vaccinated. Nevertheless, it is clear that the issues of targeting are more important when considering a vaccine of limited duration.
For example, the vaccination of young girls with a vaccine with a five-year duration may see them through their high-risk period of life, resulting in a high ratio of infections averted to delayed. The vaccination of truck drivers with the same vaccine may only delay their infections unless they are given further doses, since their risk behavior will continue after the vaccine protection has ceased. This effect has not been quantified here, but the issue of whether infections are averted or delayed is an important component in the selection of target groups.
Sensitivity of results to assumptions. The expression used above to calculate the number of cases averted per 100 entrants contains a large number of assumptions. In general, however, the difference between groups is most sensitive to the following:
• The primary period probability of infection (elasticity 1)
• The number of sexual contacts during the period (elasticity 0.4-0.5)
• The probability that no condom is used (elasticity 0.3-0.4)
• The target group HIV prevalence (elasticity 0.3-0.4)
• The average partner HIV prevalence (elasticity 0.1) The elasticities presented above are equal to the percentage change in the cases per 100 caused by a 1 percent change in the variable concerned, averaged over the risk groups considered. An elasticity of 1 means that the cases per 100 is directly proportional to the variable (as applies to the primary period probability of infection).
The sensitivity results imply that it is important to examine assumptions about the differences between groups with respect to the variables listed, since these assumptions give rise to the relative ranking of strategies and the absolute differences in effectiveness between different strategies. This is primarily important for the difference between sex workers and the general population groups. Since the value of cases averted per 100 entrants for sex workers was more than double that of any other group, the elasticities presented here imply that any one of the assumed values of these variables (other than the period probability) would have to change by more than 400 percent in order to reverse the ranking.
However, in the case of all of the other risk groups, the cases averted per 100 entrants falls within a relatively narrow range. This implies that the relative ranking between the groups could change given relatively small changes in the assumptions.
Public response to targeting in the context of high death rates. This section of the paper has analyzed and discussed a number of issues relevant to decisions relating to the targeting of a vaccine. Many problems may occur with targeted vaccination programs, and these may vary in their degree of seriousness depending on which groups are targeted. Indeed, problems may exist with the concept of targeting itself.
First, for vaccines that are not one hundred percent effective, distrust and possibly even blame for infections may arise. If people are vaccinated and still become infected, the recruitment of other candidates for vaccination may become difficult. A study in Kenya found that there was difficulty in understanding the concept of reduced risk (Forsythe 2000) .
Second, by the time a vaccine becomes available (in fifteen or twenty years or even in five), the number of deaths which will have already occurred will be great. The public response to providing a vaccine only to selected individuals may be hostile. People will be afraid and possibly become angry at their exclusion, particularly if it is in favour of sex workers or other high risk groups who they may perceive to be less worthy of protection than themselves. Third, many of the possible target groups are women, and this may fuel the perception that they are responsible for the epidemic. In the context of high death rates, this may have potentially damaging implications.
Finally, in many instances it will not be politically feasible to separate groups for targeting as they have been in the analysis. The calculation of infections averted separated schoolboys and girls; while this is useful for discussion purposes, such a policy in reality would be inequitable and difficult to defend. The implication would be that school aged children would be the target, rather than girls.
These few problems highlight that effectiveness and cost effectiveness are only inputs into a decision process, and that the final design of a vaccination program will have to consider many other economic, social and political aspects. Indeed, logistics of targeting may be such that the approach will not be considered.
Some similar problems have occurred in vaccination programs for other illnesses and efforts should be made to learn from these experiences (Nichter 1995) .
Country-specific issues relating to risk group targeting.
The analysis thus far has dealt with the region as a whole and has not discussed specific issues in relation to each country. While there are many similarities across the region, some problems may be country specific.
We have argued above in favour of providing a vaccine to high-school children. Enrollment rates in the region are, however, very different (see Figure 1 -1). While they are high in South Africa and Botswana, they are very low in Lesotho. The strength of the cost-effectiveness analysis is, however, that it allows for the ranking of interventions. The most cost effective strategy will always be to begin with the highest ranking group and vaccinate until the budget runs out or all of the groups are vaccinated. Low school enrollment alone would not, therefore, change the recommendations of the analysis.
Country specific issues may make a difference if they change the ranking of groups in terms of their cost effectiveness. If, for example, high-risk groups are easier to access in some countries and the cost of access is low, this would make them a more cost effective option, possibly changing the order of ranking.
In the case of countries in the region with very high numbers of crossborder migrants, such as Swaziland and Lesotho, they may represent a high risk easy access group. It may be possible to set up vaccination sites on the borders and record in passports the number of doses received. Therefore, while cross border migrants may not be the most cost effective target group in the region as a whole, they may be for specific countries. Similarly, sex workers may be easier or harder to locate in different countries. If sex workers are concentrated in easily identified urban areas or areas associated with particular industries or activities, then the costs of access would be lower than an in agricultural setting where they would be more widely dispersed.
The costs of delivery to all groups may also vary across countries, particularly in relation to urbanisation, population density and the cost of labour. Even if these costs vary by the same proportion for each group, it may still change the differences in cost effectiveness between groups. The importance of delivery costs is a more important component of total costs for the higher risk groups. A decrease in delivery costs of equal proportion across all groups would increase the cost effectiveness of high risk groups compared to other groups. This may even vary the rankings across countries in relation to their costs of labour and transport. Countries with higher labour costs, such as Botswana, would have added incentive to target easy to access groups.
While at this stage when the costs and effectiveness of a vaccine are unknown, it is reasonable to address questions as a region. Once details are available, country-specific assessments and planning will be necessary to identify the most cost effective strategies.
Ability and willingness to pay
Trend in the provision of other vaccines
Governments in the region have displayed a mixed attitude towards the provision of other vaccines. While all of the countries included in the study have vaccination programs, primarily aimed at young children, they have succeeded in reaching very different levels of coverage. In Figure 3 -1, the coverage rates of the BCG vaccine against tuberculosis in all the countries is displayed between 1990 and 2000. Lesotho currently has the lowest coverage with 64 percent, while Zambia is close to achieving universal coverage. The coverage rates do not appear to reflect differences in income, as Zambia has achieved some of the highest coverage rates but is the poorest country. Not only does the figure display the very different levels of coverage, but also different trends. Coverage in Lesotho was declining until 1996, while now it is apparently on the increase, although the rise is very slow. South Africa, on the other hand, has been increasing its coverage, with a very dramatic rise since the 1994 elections.
What can be surmised from the above is that governments in the region are willing to use vaccination programs as a major health intervention, but that their commitment towards them is uneven. Zambia and South Africa, and Botswana to some extent have shown very positive attitudes towards childhood vaccines with either high or rapidly increasing levels of coverage.
Current spending
Estimating the level of government expenditure on HIV/AIDS is difficult, as much of it is too intertwined with other expenditures to be separated. For example, spending on medical care for AIDS patients is difficult to distinguish from other health care spending. It is easier to estimate the level of spending on HIV programs. This spending provides an indication of the level of government commitment to fighting HIV directly. When an HIV vaccine becomes available, government will probably draw on these types of directly allocated funds.
Unfortunately comparable data are not available for all the countries in the region. In South Africa, the national government allocations are somewhat larger. In the most recent budget, one billion Rand is allocated to HIV programs (Hickey 2002 ). This figure is roughly the same as Botswana in terms of funds per HIV positive individual, although South Africa does receive additional donor support. Included in the funds allocated to HIV in South Africa is the government's support for the AIDS Vaccine Initiative, which displays a commitment to the development and use of a vaccine.
Recently, the above pattern has changed somewhat, Botswana has begun to receive large amounts of international support, and some countries in the region are gaining access to monies from the Global fund. While the figures here may be a little outdated, what is clearly displayed is the variation in the ability and willingness of governments in the region to support HIV programs. This variation is also likely to exist in countries' ability and willingness to pay for vaccine provision. The extent to which these variations will occur is likely to be determined by the constraints on supply. If a vaccine is expensive and there is no international support for purchasing, those countries with more serious budgetary limitations will be more constrained in the development of their programs.
As mentioned previously, the spending outlined above does not include amounts associated with increases in medical care costs or intertwined in other expenditures of government. The middle income countries in the region with better equipped health services, for example, will have greater motivation to vaccinate to avoid costs associated with increased demand.
The low levels of funding and the high level of reliance on international donors are clearly apparent. With the exception of Botswana and South Africa (and possibly Namibia), the large-scale provision of a vaccine with any significant cost would clearly be unattainable with the current expenditure allocation and without the support of the international community. Targeting strategies would have to be used in the context of highly restricted budgets, more so in the lowincome countries in the region, unless substantial vaccine purchase support is provided.
Economic motivation and willingness to pay
Should a vaccine become available, many individuals may be willing to pay for themselves to be vaccinated. HIV in the region is, however, largely perceived as a disease of poverty and those with higher levels of income may not perceive themselves at risk of infection. They may well, therefore, not opt to be vaccinated, while those who perceive themselves at risk may not be able to afford vaccination. Even the middle-income countries in the region may therefore not achieve high levels of private demand because of the very unequal distribution of income within the populations.
If individuals in the region did act rationally with self-interest and were willing to pay for vaccinations, there would still be a less than efficient level of demand. The vaccination of individuals offers protection to themselves and others. If individuals consider only themselves, they will ignore the benefits to society of preventing secondary infections. This externality is the obvious motivation for public subsidies The cost of labour will increase because of increased deaths among workers for both the private sector and governments. While this should provide an incentive to invest in prevention programs to avoid these costs, spending among many employers is still low compared to the cost of infections. A vaccine, however, may reduce the uncertainty of an investment in prevention if the duration and efficacy are known in advance. Employers may, therefore, respond more readily to the use of a vaccine to avoid costs than they have to the introduction of other preventative interventions.
In the analysis presented above, it was calculated that one primary infection would be averted for every four vaccines administered to a male formal sector employee. If the present value of the future cost of an infection is more than four times the cost of the vaccine, it would be rational for the employer to provide the vaccine. Figure 3 -3 presents the results of costing studies conducted in two South African companies. Even for an unskilled employee in company B (an agroindustry firm) the discounted lifetime cost per infection is over R30,000 (US$ 2,300). The cost per delivered vaccine would, therefore , only have to be less than R7,500 (US$ 580) for it to be rational for the vaccine to be provided by the employer. For company A (a utilities company covered in the same study), the costs are much higher because of the many benefits offered and the high level of training provided. In such a setting, the cost per delivered vaccine would have to be extremely high for it not to be rational for the company to provide it to its employees. While these studies were conducted in South Africa, many workers from neighboring countries work in South Africa and would be covered by such programs. The costs to companies in South Africa, on average, are higher than in other countries in the region because they often offer more benefits. Company B however, in the above example offers very few benefits and employs mostly unskilled labour, yet still the motivation to provide a vaccine would be high. Many other companies in the region will experience at least the costs associated with low level employees in company B and would therefore have similar motivation to provide employees with a vaccine.
The private sector's financial motivation to provide a vaccine would be based on the number of primary infections averted. There would, however, be positive externalities in the form of the number of secondary infections averted. This could possibly lead to a less than socially optimal level of provision, and subsidies may be required. The cost of each infection is, as seen above, very high. The cost of providing a vaccine would have to be at least a quarter of this level to result in a situation where companies' financial motivations would lead to less than full coverage of their workforce.
Given the costs incurred by employers, it would also be rational for them to act collectively to support broader vaccination programs to protect future employees and markets. This would, however, result in a public good problem where it would be in every company's best interest if every other company invested in such a program. This could be solved either by government intervention or by peer sanction.
At a national aggregate level, the analyses reported above indicate that the medium term cost of HIV/AIDS will be between 0.5-2.6 percent of GDP growth. The countries considered here have a combined GDP of about $152 billion, so that the overall cost of HIV/AIDS in terms of foregone growth might lie between $1.5 billion and $6.0 billion per annum. If public and private employers were economically rational, then this range would represent an upper limit on the total annual expenditure by the region on HIV/AIDS prevention. As can be seen from the table in Figure 3 -2, (with South Africa added), total current regional funding for HIV/AIDS is on the order of $100 million, or $0.1 billion (as of 1996) . This is substantially short (between 1.5 percent and 7 percent) of the anticipated costs of the epidemic and would still be so even if more recent increases were taken into account.
The key question for estimating the potential market for a vaccine is to assess to what extent the additional certainty introduced by a vaccine would increase the willingness to pay of private and public sector employers and public policy makers. At a national government level, this would mean a substantial revision of expenditure allocations away from other areas, some of which would also be vital for development efforts. Given the precarious state of government budgeting in most countries of the region (with the possible exception of Botswana), it would not be realistic to expect major increases financed by national public expenditure alone.
It is likely that the private sector would respond positively to the introduction of a vaccine, given the shortfall between current levels of expenditure on HIV prevention and the economically rational level. However, if the total cost per dose administered for an HIV vaccine were on the order of $3.50 or above (corresponding to the total level of current expenditure per HIV negative person aged 15-49), then the implication is that current budgets will need to double in order to accommodate a comprehensive vaccination program, unless other elements of prevention and treatment were cut. It is unlikely that this could be achieved in the short term without substantial donor funding.
Political implications
By the time a vaccine becomes available, many millions of people throughout the region will have died as a result of AIDS. Adults, children, households, and families will have felt the impacts. The private sector will have experienced an increase in the cost of labour and, in some instances, a decrease in demand for their products or services. There is likely, therefore, to be strong pressure placed on policy makers to find ways to access the vaccine. Current spending patterns on HIV prevention strategies may dramatically change in the face of a scared and angry public.
The ranking of strategies and the budgetary implications
While it is not possible to make firm conclusions without knowledge of the characteristics of a vaccine and its costs and the behavior that change might occur, the discussion and analysis do allow for some suggestions.
The analysis has identified five key variables to be considered in the design of an initial vaccination strategy:
• the cost of the vaccine
• the cost of delivery
• the effectiveness of the vaccine
The value of all of these will determine the appropriate design of strategy.
First, the higher the cost of a vaccine relative to the differences in cost of delivery, the more cost effective the vaccination of high-risk groups becomes. Second, while the effectiveness of a vaccine will not affect the cost effectiveness ranking, this variable is important when considered in conjunction with behavior changes. As was discussed previously, there are grounds to argue that high-risk groups will have a higher propensity to increase risky behavior following vaccination. If this is the case, then the effectiveness of vaccinating high-risk groups reduces by a greater margin than the effectiveness of vaccinating low risk groups as a result of an equal decrease in the effectiveness of a vaccine. If, therefore, a low efficacy vaccine becomes available, then implementation should begin with low risk groups.
Third, as has been discussed previously, different durations of vaccine effectiveness have different implications for the various groups. The difference between the high and low risk groups becomes smaller the longer the duration of protection offered by the vaccine. While at a dose for dose level (in the absence of behavior change), the vaccination of high-risk groups is always likely to be more effective, the problems of access are such that long duration vaccines could possibly be better administered to other groups. Based on the above, it is clear that for some combinations of vaccine characteristics, the decision based on cost effectiveness would be clear. If a vaccine became available that was highly effective but offered protection for only a short time and was very costly, the cost effective strategy would be to begin with highrisk groups. If, on the other hand, the vaccine was cheap (at least to the country), offered a low level of protection but for a long time, the obvious choice would be to begin with school aged children. There are, however, combinations where the conclusion will be far from clear. If, for example, a vaccine was available that was very effective, with a medium duration and had a low but not insignificant cost, careful evaluation would be required to design a vaccination strategy on cost effective criteria.
As has been stressed throughout this paper, cost effectiveness is not the only consideration. Public opinion and practicalities of access may make targeting impossible, particularly of high risk groups. Combining these issues and the cost effectiveness analysis, it would seem plausible to conclude that a vaccination strategy in the region should begin with school aged youth and work towards widespread coverage with the help of the private sector. The budgetary implications of such a strategy are impossible to determine while the price of a vaccine is not known. Estimates of what it might cost range from US$5-$100 (Stover and others 2002) . If the policy was to vaccinate all school children aged 15, this would imply the following for each country in the region (Figure 3-4) . While the middle-income countries in the region may be able to afford the lower end of the range, the low-income countries in the region would not. Clearly there will be a need to raise funds both at the country level and internationally if such a vaccination program was to be expanded. These budgetary implications are only estimated for one group. If vaccination strategies are to successfully control the spread of the epidemic, far wider coverage of the population would be required (Stover and others 2002) . The cost of such a program would obviously be much higher.
Summary and conclusions
The HIV epidemic and the ensuing AIDS deaths are having a dramatic effect on Southern Africa. The unprecedented mortality among the productive age groups is having negative consequences on households, government services, the private sector and the broader economy.
The response to this epidemic has largely focused on prevention, but as the level of illness, death and orphaning rises, so governments, donors, NGOs and community groups are increasingly expanding care and support efforts.
Many people see an HIV vaccine as the best hope for addressing the deepening crisis. While there is a vaccine in phase three trials, it is targeted at subtypes of the virus which are not prevalent in Southern Africa where the epidemic is worst. Vaccine candidates designed for use in the region are at the early stages of development and testing and are unlikely to be available for at least ten years-and more likely fifteen to twenty.
Not only is the availability of a vaccine some years away, but the first options are likely to be expensive, only partially effective and work for only a limited time. The use of these early vaccines will have to be put to maximum effect if they are to have a significant impact on the path of the epidemic.
Even if an ideal vaccine became available, use would have to begin somewhere. Past experience shows that coverage rates for other vaccines have often been slow to rise, so it is important to ensure that the maximum benefit is obtained from those vaccines distributed. Design and targeting of vaccination strategies is therefore important, even with an ideal vaccine. Targeting becomes even more important the higher the cost of the vaccine. Where it becomes a decision not only who to start with, but also who to end with, it is essential that budgets are spent in the most appropriate and effective way.
This analysis has highlighted a number of the key issues which will have to be considered in the design of a vaccination strategy. Most important among these issues is the conflict between maximum benefit per delivered HIV vaccine and the cost of delivery.
The results showed that vaccinating high-risk groups avoids more primary and secondary infections than vaccinating low risk groups. Typically, however, high-risk groups are more difficult to access, which will increase the cost of delivery and decrease the cost effectiveness.
The analysis has also pointed to the importance of timing for vaccination targeting. The effectiveness of interventions changes dramatically depending on the stage in life that one receives the vaccine.
To maximize efficiency, a vaccination strategy should begin with the most cost effective option and work down the list as far as finances allow. This process, however, is unlikely to be as straightforward as one group followed by another. The importance of the cost of delivery in determining cost effectiveness may mean that there will be substantial variation in terms of ranking within groups as well as between them. Some members of a group may be easier to access than others.
For example, the marginal cost of delivering a vaccine to sex workers is likely to decrease as more are vaccinated, as a result of economies of scale. At a certain point, however, the marginal cost will rapidly increase, since it will be increasingly difficult to locate additional individuals to vaccinate. In the South African context, some sex workers are based in escort agencies and therefore the cost of delivery would be relatively low compared to those working on the streets or in other less formal arrangements. The cost effectiveness of vaccinating easy to locate sex workers is, therefore, likely to be high, even if the average cost effectiveness of vaccinating all sex workers is low as a result of the high average cost of delivery.
The key determinant of the final ranking of strategies according to their cost effectiveness is not the efficacy or duration of the vaccine, or even the cost of the vaccine in absolute terms. The final ranking will largely be determined by the relationship between the cost of the vaccine and the difference in cost of delivering such a vaccine to different groups. The cost of delivery will, in turn, be determined by the prevalence of the group (whether testing and counseling is needed) and the ease of locating participants.
Ignoring the cost of delivery, the analysis found that the three most effective strategies are to vaccinate sex workers, followed by high school girls, and the military and prisoners a joint third. If, however, the cost of delivery is considered, and it is twice or more times as expensive to deliver a vaccine to sex workers than to schoolgirls, then vaccinating schoolgirls becomes the most cost-effective option.
Interestingly, other than sex workers, the other very high-risk groups, such as transport workers and male STD clinic attendees, did not feature in the top three even when the cost of delivery was ignored. This is because their high-risk behavior means that many of them, and their partners, are already infected, making it too late for vaccination strategies to be effective. The situation regarding high-risk groups would be very different in the context of an epidemic in its infancy.
While it is not possible to make firm recommendations in the absence of data on the likely cost of the vaccine, or the cost of delivery to specific groups, it is probably safe to argue the following. If a vaccine is costly, vaccination programs should begin by targeting easy to locate commercial sex workers, and then move on to schoolchildren. On the other hand, if a vaccine were very cheap, the intervention should begin with school children. As a vaccination program expands, it should move to cover easy to access groups such as the military, prisoners and, if possible, the employed population.
The above conclusions are based on efficiency criteria only and assume that the value of one infection averted is equal regardless of who the individual is. There are, however, three interrelated issues which may influence the program design: the public's response, the differential value placed on human lives, and the question of equity. While some of these have been discussed in this paper, they are largely beyond its scope. It is necessary, however, to note that while efficiency criteria are important, they are not the only ones which are needed to inform the development of an appropriate response.
For a vaccination intervention to be effective, the support of the governments in the region will be necessary. While vaccination programs of some sort exist throughout the region indicating a willingness of governments to use vaccines as large-scale public health interventions, they experience different levels of support. It is clear from an assessment of current regional expenditure on HIV prevention and treatment that introducing even a moderately inexpensive vaccine in the short term would require substantial increases in existing budgets. There is at present little capacity to increase government expenditure to the required levels without major revisions in priorities.
The attitudes, however, toward an HIV vaccine may well be very different and more consistent, given the probable social and political context both within the region and internationally. There will be pressure on governments and the international community to ensure that vaccines are made available. Countries in the region, however, have mixed ability to finance programs. While South Africa, Botswana and Namibia may be in a position to distribute vaccines, other countries will likely be unable to without foreign support. In the short to medium term, it is clear that substantial donor funding will be required.
Unless a vaccine is extremely expensive, the private sector in the region will have a strong incentive to support vaccination programs for their work force and collectively, even for the population at large. There will also be motivation for regional cooperation, since there is a great deal of cross border movement. For example, vaccination programs in Swaziland will have positive externalities for South Africa.
A vaccine will not be the silver bullet which puts an end to this crisis. In ten years time, approximately ten million people in Southern Africa will be HIV positive. A similar number will have died, leaving several million orphans requiring care and support. The availability of a vaccine will do little for these people and their families. A vaccine could play an important role in addressing this epidemic but can never be more than part of a coordinated response. Therefore, while efforts must continue toward the development of a vaccine, greater effort is required to build the rest of the response necessary for the people of this region to deal effectively with this crisis.
Appendix 1. Data and Assumptions
The assumptions about population sizes, HIV prevalence, HIV incidence and sexual behavior are all contained in the table shown in Figure 1 . 
Appendix 2. Calculations of infections averted
Primary infections averted
The probability of a "primary" infection refers to whether or not an individual would have been infected with HIV without having been vaccinated. It does not include the probability that the individual would have gone on to infect other people. This is referred to as "secondary" infection.
• The duration of the period of immunity offered by the vaccine
• The average probability that a typical group member would otherwise have become infected during the period of protection of the vaccine.
In general, the number of primary cases averted by vaccinating an HIV negative individual may be expressed as a simple product, as follows:
where: PI(t) = primary infections averted by vaccination at time t VE = efficacy of the vaccine (between 0 and 1) N = size of the group Pd(t) = period infection probability for the group at time t d = duration of protection of the vaccine
The meaning of the "period infection probability" depends on the length of the period. If the period under consideration is one year, then the period probability is equal to the probability that an individual will be infected during that year. This is also the definition of the incidence of HIV infection for the group. For periods of longer than one year, the period probability must be calculated from the incidence within the group for each of the years in the period, as follows:
where: Pd(t) = period probability of infection at time t d = duration of period I(t) = HIV incidence at time t (1 year probability of infection)
Equation 6.2 shows that the period probability (and therefore the primary cases averted from equation 6.1) depends on the way in which HIV incidence (labeled I) is expected to evolve for the cohort over the period. The evolution of HIV incidence is in turn dependent upon the expected risk behavior of the cohort over this period and will vary considerably between different risk groups. Figure 1 shows the relationship between a 5-year period probability and HIV prevalence for a high-risk group and the way in which it might evolve as the group ages. The figure shows an illustrative loop, which the cohort group will traverse in an counter-clockwise direction. For a cohort of HIV negative 12 year olds, both prevalence and period probability are close to zero and will remain so until the cohort begins sexual activity or other risk behavior. When this begins (stage 1), the period probability will rise rapidly, while prevalence rises much more slowly, since few individuals in the group are infected at first. After a few years, prevalence will begin to rise more rapidly and the period probability will begin to fall, as some individuals are already infected and the pool of uninfected members is smaller (stage 2). This trend will continue so that there is a negative relationship between prevalence and period probability (period probability falls while prevalence rises) until significant numbers of the cohort begin to die. At this point, at the top of the loop, prevalence begins to fall, while period probability also falls because there is less risk behavior among older people (stage 3).
Different risk groups are typically in different parts of this cycle. For example, commercial sex workers who have been working for a number of years would exhibit very high prevalence but relatively low incidence -they are near the top of the loop (end of stage 2). Teenage girls who have just begun sexual activity would be expected to exhibit high incidence but low prevalence -they are at the right-hand side (end of stage 1) of the loop.
The size of the illustrated loop would depend upon the degree of risk behavior for the group concerned. Figure 2 shows how these relationships might evolve for a set of illustrative risk groups. As can be seen, the more pronounced the risk behavior of the group, the larger the scale of the loop, so that the group exhibits higher incidence at the early stages and higher prevalence at the later stages. When individuals move from one risk group to another (for example, when an adolescent girl becomes a commercial sex worker, or a commercial sex worker stops sex work), then their risk profile would move from one of these curves to another, representing a change from one type of risk behavior to a different one.
The analysis estimated the primary cases averted by simulating the evolution of prevalence and infection probability for different risk groups. This made use of the illustrative risk groups as represented in the simulation model developed by the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA). The results are shown in Figure 2 . Although it is no substitute for the use of real data (which are lacking), the benefit of this method is that it gives a realistic estimate of the period probability in a Southern African setting, while arriving at a "best guess" at the differences in likely risk behavior between the different risk groups.
Secondary infections averted
• the number of sexual contacts with these partners
It is necessary to calculate the probable number of people the individual would have infected if he or she had not been successfully vaccinated. The more sexual partners and more sexual contacts they have, the higher the number of people they would infect. Similarly, the greater the individuals' probability of having an STI and the higher the STI prevalence of their partners, the higher the probability -per sexual contact -that they would transmit HIV. On the other hand, the higher their condom use the lower the probability of transmission per contact. Finally, the higher the existing level of HIV among their partners, the lower the chance that their future partners are HIV negative to begin with. Preventing a repeat infection of an already infected individual is not an infection averted.
The number of secondary infections averted was calculated for each risk group based on the above variables and the following formula: 
Where: CCTd = The number of sexual contacts with casual partners PP = The probability that the partner is already HIV positive NC = The proportion of contacts where a condom is not used RNC = The risk of HIV transmission per sexual contact without a condom C = The proportion of contacts where a condom is used =(1-NC) RC = The risk of HIV transmission per sexual contact with a condom d = duration of efficacy of the vaccine
The equation is broken into two sections. The first estimates the probability that the contact was with an HIV negative partner. The second half estimates the probability that the contact would have resulted in transmission of HIV if the individual had not been vaccinated. The second half consists of a weighted average of the risk of transmission with and without the use of a condom (the weight is determined by the level of condom use). The risk with and without a condom is calculated as follows: RNC = STD*STII*(IPS+PPS) (5) RC = RNC*CE
Where: ü STD = The risk of transmission between otherwise healthy adults (differs depending on the sex of the individual) ü STII = The STI inflator, the factor by which the presence of an STI in one partner increases the risk of transmission ü IPS = The individuals probability of being infected with an STI ü PPS = The partners probability of being infected with an STI ü CE = Condom efficacy
The equation implies that the STI inflator is doubled when an STI is present in both partners. The expression assumes that the prevalence of STIs is independently distributed from that of HIV infection. Without this assumption, calculations become cumbersome and time consuming and change little in the final result.
The calculation of secondary infections among regular partners is somewhat different. If the method outlined above for casual partners were used, it would be possible for a situation to arise where the prevention of one infection would be counted more than once. It is necessary, therefore, to adjust the formula as follows: RPIA = NP * (1-PP) * [NC(1-(1-RNC)^ RCTd) + C(1-(1-RC)^ RCTd)]
Where: ü NP = The number of regular partners ü RCTd = The number of sexual contacts per regular partner The calculation of risk with and without a condom remains the same.
The values of the variables included in these equations will be determined by the duration of efficacy of the vaccine. The number of contacts and the number of sexual partners will apply to the period for which the vaccine is effective. The efficacy of the vaccine makes no difference to the calculations at this stage. These calculations are based on the assumption that the primary infection has been averted.
The above calculations effectively assume that had the individual not been vaccinated, he or she would have become infected the very next time having sex. The combination, in the following section, of primary and secondary infection calculations will address this problem. Secondary infections averted will only be included for primary infections averted, averaged over the period. Although there are more sophisticated methods to achieve this correction, they would complicate the analysis and would have little effect on the magnitude of secondary infections or the ranking of target groups in terms of effectiveness.
It is also possible that a vaccine may lead to changes in sexual behavior resulting from changed perceptions of risk. In the calculations presented in this paper, no attempt has been made to introduce behavior change. The behavior variables used in the calculations are based on the data that are available, which are weak and incomplete. There is therefore no quantitative basis for estimating the impact of a vaccine on behavior change in the different risk groups, so it would not affect the relative ranking of the groups in terms of effectiveness. The implications of changes in behavior prompted by the introduction of a vaccine are, however, discussed below.
The above approach to calculating secondary infections has a number of limitations. First, the method assumes that sexual partners can be divided into two groups-casual one-time partners and long-term partners. In reality, these are the two extremes and there exists a host of different combinations. These could be included by estimating an equation 2.8 for all the different number of sexual contacts. This would however greatly increase the computational burden, and given that such desegregated data does not exist, such an approach was not used. This omission results in an over estimation of secondary infections averted, as a result of double counting for groups with a high number of infrequent but not once off sexual partners. Effectively this means that the calculations over estimate the effectiveness of vaccinating high-risk groups Second, the calculations do not consider the possibility that future partners may also have been vaccinated. The method, therefore, over estimates the effectiveness for all groups. However, the focus of the paper is on where to begin a vaccination strategy, and this issue is not of critical importance at this stage. Evaluating a broad based vaccination programs requires the use of complex simulation models, which have been deemed beyond the scope of this work (see Stover and others 2002 for an example of this work).
Third, the calculations make the simplifying assumption that STIs and HIV among future partners are distributed independently of each other. Again, this simplification was made to avoid over complicating the analysis.
Total infections averted
The previous two sections have outlined the calculation of the number of primary and secondary infections averted. The estimation of the total number of infections averted per vaccinated HIV negative individuals involves the combination of the previous two calculations as follows:
Infections averted = VE * [primary + ( primary*secondary)]
Where: ü VE = the efficacy of the vaccine ü primary = the probability that the individual would have been infected had they not received the vaccine ü secondary = the number of infections averted by avoiding a primary infection Unless the possibility of behavior change as a result of vaccination is introduced into the calculation, the efficacy of the vaccine will still make no difference to the ranking of strategies in terms of their effectiveness. Given a decision to vaccinate, which would in part be motivated by the efficacy, the most effective strategies will be the most effective regardless of the efficacy of the vaccine. A change in the efficacy changes the impact of vaccination of all groups by the same proportion and will not affect their effectiveness in relation to one another. Changes in the duration of protection are, however, more important at this stage. While behavior change is not included in the calculations, it is discussed in the text Changes in the duration change the probability of averting a primary infection. This change will have different implications for the effectiveness of vaccinations in different risk groups.
Infections averted per 100 entrants into the program
The method described above estimates the number of infections averted per vaccine administered to an HIV negative individual. The vaccination of an HIV positive individual will result in no infections averted and may well lead to a false sense of security which could increase the risk of others. Considering only the number of infections averted in this way ignores the costs and complications associated with ensuring that only HIV negative individuals receive vaccinations. A more meaningful measure would be the number of infections averted per 100 entrants into a vaccination program. This calculation was as follows: Per100 = Total infections averted * (1-target group prevalence)*100 (9)
The vaccination of members of high-risk groups is likely to avert more infections than the vaccination of members of lower risk groups. The impact is, however, likely to be diluted by the need to exclude many vaccination candidates because they are already HIV positive. If the cost of screening is significant relative to the cost of a vaccine, this may have important implications for policy. Policy decisions may be further complicated by the difficulties associated with locating members of high-risk groups.
